Mints has given a deductive calculus, a set of proof rules, for pure Prolog such that the goal X = A1,..., An succeeds in Prolog iff X is derivable in this calculus and X fails in Prolog iff ()X is derivable in this calculus. We summarise Mints' results and give appropriate modifications of his calculus to deal with use of negated goals in Prolog, SLD- resolution, SLDNF-resolution, extensions of SLDNF-resolution allowing negation as failure to be applied to nonground negative literals.

In the seminiferous tubule of the mammalian testis, one type A1 spermatogonium (diploid, 2n) divides and differentiates into 256 spermatozoa (haploid, n) during spermatogenesis. To complete spermatogenesis and produce ∼150 × 106 spermatozoa each day in a healthy man, germ cells must migrate progressively across the seminiferous epithelium yet remain attach to the nourishing Sertoli cells. This active cell migration process involves precisely controlled restructuring events at the tight (TJ) and anchoring junctions at the cell–cell interface. While the hormonal events (...) that regulate spermatogenesis by follicle‐stimulating hormone and testosterone from the pituitary gland and Leydig cells, respectively, are known, less is known about the mechanism(s) that regulates junction restructuring during germ cell movement in the seminiferous epithelium. The relative position of tight (TJs) and anchoring junctions in the testis is of interest. Sertoli cell TJs that constitute the blood–testis barrier (BTB) are present side by side with anchoring junctions and are adjacent to the basement membrane. This intimate physical association with the TJs, the anchoring junctions and the basement membrane (a modified form of extracellular matrix, ECM) suggests a role for the ECM in the junction dynamics of the testis. Indeed, evidence is accumulating that ECM proteins are crucial to Sertoli cell TJ dynamics. In this review, we discuss the pivotal role of tumor necrosis factor α (TNFα) on BTB dynamics via its effects on the homeostasis of ECM proteins. In addition, discussion will also be focused on the novel findings regarding the role of non‐basement‐membrane‐associated ECM proteins and components of focal adhesion (a cell–matrix anchoring junction type) in the regulation of junction dynamics in the testis. BioEssays 26:978–992, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In [1], D. W. Hart and C. Mcginn considered two logics Al and A2. These logics embody part of a tradition about a priori knowledge and necessity. They proved that A2 is a conservative extension of a well-known modal logic S5 but left the problem whether Al is a conservative extension of S4 open. In this note, we shall show that Al is not a conservative extension of S4 but of S5, and also correct an inadequate proof.

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument ''If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1'' where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature ''there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied'', and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., ''If C then A2'') will (...) lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ghazali and Demonstrative Science MICHAEL E. MARMURA I MEDIEVALISLA_MICtheologians subjected Aristotle's theory of the essential efficient cause to severe criticism and rejected it. This criticism and rejection finds its most forceful expression in the writings of Ghazali (al-Ghaz~li) (d. 1111).1 In his Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), he argues on logical and empirical grounds that the alleged necessary connection between what is habitually regarded as the natural (...) efficient cause and its effect cannot be proven. He does not, however, take an agnostic stand on this question but proceeds to affirm two points: (1) that there is no causal agency in natural things; (2) that all natural events are the direct creation of God. Ghazali, moreover, does not confine such divine action to the realm of the inanimate and the irrational, in his al-Iqtis.~d fi-l-Ftiqad (The Golden Mean of Belief), he affirms the doctrine that the individual human act, like any other occurrence in the world, is also the direct creation of God. Causal efficacy resides in God alone. But the divine act, for Ghazali, is not an essential act. It does not proceed as the necessary consequence of divine essence. It is the arbitrary decree of the divine will, an attribute coeternal, but not identical with divine essence. Ghazali thus denies essential action altogether. In all this, he gives expression to the occasionalism of the Islamic school of dogmatic theology (kal~m) to which he belonged, the Ashcarite school. Ghazali had also a keen interest in logic. He wrote logical treatises for his fellow theologians, encouraging them to master this art as a tool to rebutt their doctrinal opponents. The~ treatises, in the main, sum up and explain the logic used by the Islamic philosophers--a logic that reflects the Stoic and Aristotelian traditions. Ghazali recognizes formal logic to be philosophically neutral, and hence in no way conflicting with his theology." He does not confine himself to formal logic in these expositions, however, but discusses Aristotelian demonstration. And it is in his statements on demonstration that we seem to be confronted with paradox. Demonstrative science, as understood by the Islamic philosophers, rests on the theory of essential causes and functions in terms of it. Indeed, in his reply to Ghazali's rejection of essential efficient causes in nature, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (d. 1198) argues Texts frequently referred to in the notes will be abbreviated as follows: Demonstration: Ibn Sin~, Al-Shifa~; Logic V.; Demonstration, ed. A. E. Affifi,revised by I. Madkur (Cairo, 1956). Iqti~dd: A1-Ghaz~li, Al-Iqtisad Fi-l-ICtiqad(Cairo: no date). Metaphysics: Ibn Sin~, A1-Shif~: al-Ilah~yat (Metaphysics), ed. C. C. Anawati, S. Dunya, and S. Zayd, revised by I. Madkur (2 vols.; Cairo, 1960). MI: AI-Ghaz~lI,MiCyaral-CIlm,ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961). TF: A1-Ghaz~ll, Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927). TT: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Tahafut al-Tahafut, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1930). 2 TF., pp. 15-17. [1831 184 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that such a rejection would render demonstrative science impossible. We would have no true knowledge; at best, only opinion. 3For this staunch defender of Aristotle, the theory of natural efficient causality constitutes a necessary condition for demonstrative science. Yet Ghazali in his writings does not deny the claim that demonstration gives us certain knowledge about the natural order. On the contrary, he seems to be affirming this in both his Tahdfutand the logical treatise he appended to this work, Mi~jdral-CIlm(The Standardfor Knowledge).If Ghazali does in fact uphold this claim for demonstration, then he must either deny that the theory of essential efficient causality is a necessary condition for demonstrative science, or fall into contradiction. At first glance, Ghazali's position in the Micy~r,where he gives his most comprehensive treatment of demonstration, is highly ambiguous and suggests contradiction. He seems for the most part to be reproducing the essentials of the Aristotelian demonstrative theory. Although in one section he reaffirms his rejection of necessary causal connection in nature, he nonetheless continues to use such terms as "cause," "effect," "necessity" and "certainty" in what appear to be... (shrink)

We study a range of issues connected with the idea of replacing one formula by another in a fixed context. The replacement core of a consequence relation ⊢ is the relation holding between a set of formulas {A1,..., Am,...} and a formula B when for every context C, we have C,..., C,... ⊢ C. Section 1 looks at some differences between which inferences are lost on passing to the replacement cores of the classical and intuitionistic consequence relations. For example, we (...) find that while the inference from A and B to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$A \land B$\end{document}, sanctioned by both these initial consequence relations, is retained on passage to the replacement core in the classical case, it is lost in the intuitionistic case. Further discussion of these two logics occupies Sections 3 and 4. Section 2 looks at the m = 1 case, describing A as replaceable by B according to ⊢ when B is a consequence of A by the replacement core of ⊢, and inquiring as to which choices of ⊢ render this induced replaceability relation symmetric. Section 5 investigates further conceptual refinements— such as a contrast between horizontal and vertical replaceability—suggested by some work of R. B. Angell and R. Harrop in the 1950s and 1960s. Appendix 1 examines a related aspect of term-for-term replacement in connection with identity in predicate logic. Appendix 2 is a repository for proofs which would otherwise clutter up Section 3. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To (...) refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive. (shrink)

According to Glaucus of Rhegium Democritus was “a disciple of a Pythagorean” (dk 68 A1, 38). The tetralogical catalog of his works prepared by Thrasylus begins its section on ethics with the three following works: Pythagoras; On the Disposition of the Wise Man; On the Things in Hades (dk 68 B0a–c). The very order of the first three ethical works of Democritus could point to some sort of dependence on Pythagoreanism. This was suggested earlier by Frank (1923: 67), who believes (...) that this is due to the fact that Democritus saw Pythagoras as basically the founder of an ethic-religious sect. Without being forced to agree with Frank, it is undeniable that there are many similarities between Pythagorean and Democritean ethics. The Democritean sentences that speak about the sense of shame before oneself as a way of preventing evil deeds (dk 68 B84, 244, and 264) recalls the practice of anamnesis, the examination of conscience in the Pythagorean tradition. Even more important are the parallel uses of measure as a basis for ethical reasoning. This paper aims to review this connection between Pythagorean traditions and Democritus, examining what emerges as the most probable core issue to determine how close this relation between atomists and Pythagoreans could have been: the Aristotelian testimony (de An. 1.2 404a16-20 [dk 58 B40]) on the material conception of the Pythagorean soul. In fact, a corpuscular conception of the soul (“dust in the air”), foreshadowing the psychology of Democritus, is attributed to the Pythagoreans. Is the argument of de An. 1.2 404a16-20 a misunderstanding by Aristotle? Or does this testimony represent an actual dialogue that Pythagoreans were having with atomists in the fifth century bce? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A RETURN TO THE SUBJECT: THE THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHARLES TAYLOR'S SOURCES OF THE SELF JAMES J. BUCKLEY Loyola College Baltimore, Maryland ECENT THEOLOGIANS have widely argued (or pve-. sumed) that modernity's 1turn to the subject creates deep p11ohlems for imagining, thinking about, or enacting who we m'e. These theologians do not aJwaJ"s agree on what constitutes "modernity." And they ra11e!ly agree on the 'alternative to " the turn (...) to the :subject.'' That is, some theologians airgue or presume that the turn from the subject ought to he baiekwa:rid, retrieving our sou11ces prior to what Vatican II and others c:a:lrl "the modeTn world;" others argue o'l.' presume tha:t the turn ought be forwavd to "post-modernity," either accommodating ourseh11es to the decentered selves of the post-modern secular avant garde or proclaiming the strange, new wo1'1d of the Bible. Hut neo-Augustinians and Thomists, liberation theologians and pragmatists, Wittgensrteinians and Barthians all roughly agree (in spite of deep disagx,eements) that we need to turn from the subject;1 Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity is a massivie challenge to these presumptions and argument1s.2 It is, we might s'ay, a call to re-turn to the :subjeict-;hut quwlified this time by a gl'e3.1ter sense of this subject 'is historiml context in the Enlightenment and Romantioism 1 For a summary of critiques of different turns to the subject, see David H. Kelsey, "Human Being," in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King, Second Edition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985 [Firnt Edition, 1982]), Chapter 6. 2 Charles Taylor Sources of the Sdf: The Making of the JJiodern Identity (Harvard University Press, 1989), referred to in the body of this essay by page numbers in parentheses. 497 498 JAMES J. BUCKLEY a1s weU.as this subject's constant ternptaition to undermine the very world it mak!es. A rea1der's response to the book wilil depend not only on how one rea1ds Taylor (e.g., does he under- or over-qualify his ca11 to return to Lhe subject?) but also on where the reader finds heriseilf on the tlieological spectrum. However, the fact that T.aylor',s book has been greeted with critical enthusiasm by both theologiical 'agnostics and contempomry Augustinians and Thomists suggests tha1t it is a book whose power and scope will resonabe with very different sort1s of men and women.3 My aim here is not to summarize or 1 assess the riches of this book. Soumes of the Self is a book of such clarity, power, and 1scope that lit will takce some 1 time for rea;ders (or, ak least, this reader) fo absorb it a;nd to respond :to Taylor adequateJy. My aim is much more modest, nameJy, to pursue some of the connections between Tayl:or's proposal and theology. These connections vv:i.11 suggest some chores Taylor has discoveil'ed or crea;ted for theoilogians. I rea:lize that I risk doing an injustice to a book by a philosopher, not a theologian. Tayfor is candid about hls own theologica1l convictions, while not pretending fully to ddend or evcen fully expl~ca:te those convictions. Nonetihe1ess, I wiill show tha:t his theses challenge n1any of us in ways tha:t justify a foous on theo1ogica,l isisues.Je objecition to. Tayloi; rightly speaks of the "anti-humanism of much evange[ieail rie~ ligion today," bu:t I be1ievie he is mistaken when he fails to 1.2 He carefully distinguishes neo-Nietzscheans like Lyotard, Derrida, and even Foucault, from Nietzsche himself, who had a kind of "saving inconsistency " (489) in his simultaneous affirmation and denial of a " sense of the magnificent, of the categorically affi.rmable, of the infinitely worthy of love " (453). ON CHARLES TAYLOR 509 qualify lthis "murch" and also when he caMs "figures like Cardina1l Ra:tzinger" anti-humanistic (318). He!thinks that abortion debrutes a're not so murch deep disagreements as they are exceptionail disagreements that only provie h0:w suhs1tantial our agreements are (515). But Taylor... (shrink)

LetA≤Bbe structures, and${\cal K}$a class of structures. An elementb∈BisdominatedbyArelative to${\cal K}$if for all${\bf{C}} \in {\cal K}$and all homomorphismsg,g':B → Csuch thatgandg'agree onA, we havegb=g'b. Our main theorem states that if${\cal K}$is closed under ultraproducts, thenAdominatesbrelative to${\cal K}$if and only if there is a partial functionFdefinable by a primitive positive formula in${\cal K}$such thatFB(a1,…,an) =bfor somea1,…,an∈A. Applying this result we show that a quasivariety of algebras${\cal Q}$with ann-ary near-unanimity term has surjective epimorphisms if and only if$\mathbb{S}\mathbb{P}_n \mathbb{P}_u \left( {\mathcal{Q}_{{\text{RSI}}} } \right)$has (...) surjective epimorphisms. It follows that if${\cal F}$is a finite set of finite algebras with a common near-unanimity term, then it is decidable whether the (quasi)variety generated by${\cal F}$has surjective epimorphisms. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with extensions of geometric stability theory to some nonelementary classes. We prove the following theorem:Theorem. Let [Formula: see text] be a large homogeneous model of a stable diagram D. Let p, q ∈ SD(A), where p is quasiminimal and q unbounded. Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Suppose that there exists an integer n < ω such that [Formula: see text] for any independent a1, …, an∈ P and finite subset C ⊆ Q, but (...) [Formula: see text] for some independent a1, …, an, an+1∈ P and some finite subset C ⊆ Q.Then [Formula: see text] interprets a group G which acts on the geometry P′ obtained from P. Furthermore, either [Formula: see text] interprets a non-classical group, or n = 1,2,3 and•If n = 1 then G is abelian and acts regularly on P′.•If n = 2 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the affine action of K ⋊ K* on the algebraically closed field K.•If n = 3 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the action of PGL2(K) on the projective line ℙ1(K) of the algebraically closed field K.We prove a similar result for excellent classes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

"A rich collection. Since it holds a number of introductory pieces along with advanced essays and review articles, the volume will be accessible to a broad audience and will work well in philosophy of science courses....Essential."--Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan.

The current study examines patterns of attachment/self-protective strategies and rates of unresolved loss/trauma in children and adolescents presenting to a multidisciplinary gender service. Fifty-seven children and adolescents (8.42–15.92 years; 24 birth-assigned males and 33 birth-assigned females) presenting with gender dysphoria participated in structured attachment interviews coded using dynamic-maturational model (DMM) discourse analysis. The children with gender dysphoria were compared to age- and sex-matched children from the community (non-clinical group) and a group of school-age children with mixed psychiatric disorders (mixed psychiatric (...) group). Information about adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), mental health diagnoses, and global level of functioning was also collected. In contrast to children in the non-clinical group, who were classified primarily into the normative attachment patterns (A1-2, B1-5, and C1-2) and who had low rates of unresolved loss/trauma, children with gender dysphoria were mostly classified into the high-risk attachment patterns (A3-4, A5-6, C3-4, C5-6, and A/C) (χ2= 52.66;p< 0.001) and had a high rate of unresolved loss/trauma (χ2= 18.64;p< 0.001). Comorbid psychiatric diagnoses (n= 50; 87.7%) and a history of self-harm, suicidal ideation, or symptoms of distress were also common. Global level of functioning was impaired (range 25–95/100; mean = 54.88;SD= 15.40; median = 55.00). There were no differences between children with gender dysphoria and children with mixed psychiatric disorders on attachment patterns (χ2= 2.43;p= 0.30) and rates of unresolved loss and trauma (χ2= 0.70;p= 0.40).Post hocanalyses showed that lower SES, family constellation (a non-traditional family unit), ACEs—including maltreatment (physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, neglect, and exposure to domestic violence)—increased the likelihood of the child being classified into a high risk attachment pattern. Akin to children with other forms of psychological distress, children with gender dysphoria present in the context of multiple interacting risk factors that include at-risk attachment, unresolved loss/trauma, family conflict and loss of family cohesion, and exposure to multiple ACEs. (shrink)

This chapter introduces a distinctive approach for scientific metaphysics. Instead of drawing metaphysical conclusions by interpreting the most basic theories of science, this approach draws metaphysical conclusions by analyzing how multifaceted practices of science work. Broadening attention opens the door to drawing metaphysical conclusions from a wide range of sciences. This chapter analyzes conceptual practice in genetics to argue that the reality investigated by biologists lacks an overall structure. It expands this conclusion to motivate the no general structure thesis, which (...) states that the world lacks a general, overall structure that spans scales. It concludes that the no general structure thesis counts as metaphysics because it says something very important and general about the world. This thesis informs science as well as philosophy of science, and it provides a useful perspective for societies that look upon science to help solve complex problems in our changing world. (shrink)

This volume from the _Collected Works of C.G. Jung_ has become known as perhaps the best introduction to Jung's work. In these famous essays he presented the essential core of his system. This is the first paperback publication of this key work in its revised and augmented second edition. The earliest versions of the essays are included in an Appendices, containing as they do the first tentative formulations of Jung's concept of archetypes and the collective unconscious, as well as his (...) germinating theory of types. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hylomorphism, Change, and God's Mutability:A Rejoinder to Ebrahim AzadeganAmirhossein Zadyousefi (bio)In "A Long Way to God's Mutability: A Response to Ebrahim Azadegan"1 I tried to challenge what Azadegan says in his "On the Incompatibility of God's Knowledge of Particulars and the Doctrine of Divine Immutability: Towards a Reform in Islamic Theology."2 Then, in his "Necessary Existence, Immutability, and God's Knowledge of Particulars: A Reply to Amirhossein Zadyousefi,"3 Azadegan replies (...) to my response. In my response to Azadegan, I discussed many points, and Azadegan did not deal with all of them in his reply. So, in this short rejoinder, I will deal with what Azadegan has said about some of my criticisms. Before proceeding, I should say that in my response to Azadegan I remained neutral on whether God is mutable or not. All I have done there is to show that Azadegan's path to God's mutability by adopting Sadra's knowledge-by-presence theory is not as easy as it initially seems. Also, I have tried to show that Avicenna does not adopt the dogma of God's immutability. Rather, he has some reasons for adopting this view. I understand that one might challenge Avicenna's reasons for God's immutability. But, as I insisted in my first response to Azadegan, we should be careful not to conflate having a dogma with having a bad reason.In his reply to my response, Azadegan states that "according to Zadyousefi, Avicenna believes in an incompatibility between God's necessary existence and the denial of divine immutability." Then, he presents the following argument that he calls "Argument from God's Necessary Existence to His Immutability": [End Page 196]A1:1. God is a necessary existent.2. A necessary being possesses his attributes necessarily (the principle of 'Necessity of a necessary Being's Attributes').3. If God has a certain knowledge-set, then He has it necessarily.4. A necessary existent exists in all possible worlds and at all times.5. In all possible worlds God has a certain fixed knowledge-set.6. So what God knows at w1 (in a possible world w1 or in time t1 in the actual world) is the same as what God knows at w2 (or t2).7. Therefore, God is immutable."4But I have not argued by virtue of the above argument that according to Avicenna God's being a necessary existent is inconsistent with God's mutability. Instead, I have presented the following argument to show that:A2:Avicenna, following Aristotle, explains change via matter. That is, if something undergoes change or can undergo change, then it is composed of matter and form and hence it is material. Now, since every material being is constituted by a matter-form compound, every material being is dependent on its constituents (matter and form) and therefore is a contingent being. For a contingent being, according to Avicenna, is a being that is dependent on something else. So, every material being would be contingent. Therefore, God's mutability entails God's being material, which in turn entails God's being contingent. So, God's being a necessary existent is incompatible with God's mutability.As we can see, this argument is completely different from A1. I suspect Azadegan's A1 is a misinterpretation of an objection that I raised against him. In his initial paper, following Ghazālī, Azadegan states that, according to Avicenna, God's knowledge of particulars is in tension with God's eternality. In my response, I argued that this is not the case. According to Avicenna, God's knowledge of changing particulars, based on some certain mechanism for knowing the occurrence of a change among particulars (i.e., knowledge of change through indexical propositions), is in tension with God's being a necessary existent. I stated this inconsistency as follows:A3:8. God is omniscient.9. Therefore, for any change C among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C.10. For any knower S, if S knows the occurrence of C, then S's set of knowledge changes (based on indexical propositions). [End Page 197]11. If S's set of knowledge changes... (shrink)

C. A. J. Coady offers to clear up confusion about what terrorism is. His "tactical definition" focuses on terrorist acts as violent attacks upon non-combatants. He discusses what it means to be a non-combatant, considers various philosophical attempts to defend terrorism, and examines the idea of a connection between religion and terrorism.

Volume 1 of the Routledge History of Philosophy covers one of the most remarkable periods in human thought. The essays present the fundamental approaches and thinkers of Greek philosophy in chronological order.

The poly(A)‐dependent translational regulation of maternal mRNAs is an important mechanism to execute stage‐specific programs of protein synthesis during early development. This control underlies many crucial developmental events including the meiotic maturation of oocytes and activation of the mitotic cell cycle at fertilization. A recent report(1) demonstrates that the 3′ untranslated region of the cyclin A1, B1, B2 and c‐mos mRNAs determines the timing and extent of their cytoplasmic polyadenylation and translational activation during Xenopus oocyte maturation. These studies further establish (...) that protein synthesis can be temporally and quantitatively controlled by developmentally regulated changes in the polyadenylation of maternal mRNAs. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

This chapter is written for an audience that is not intimately familiar with the philosophy of animal consumption. It provides an overview of the harms that animals, the environment, and humans endure as a result of industrial animal agriculture, and it concludes with a defense of ostroveganism and a tentative defense of cultured meat.

This article investigates the profound mysteries of consciousness and the afterlife, which have captivated humanity for centuries. In our study, we conducted three hypothetical experiments, assuming all participants had healthy brains and minds in similar environments. We based our methodology on the premise that cell death can preserve anatomical and neural integrity (Vrselja et al., 2019). Between T1 and T2, six brains were rendered non-functional (brain death), eliminating consciousness. Participants were divided into three groups: -/- 1. Identical Triplets (Group I): (...) Individuals 'a,' 'b,' and 'c.' 2. Second Set of Identical Triplets (Group II): Individuals 'd,' 'e,' and 'f.' 3. Non-identical Triplets (Group III): Individuals 'g,' 'h,' and 'i.' -/- Uniform conditions were maintained across all groups, ensuring identical nutrients and processes. In the third experiment, we preserved the inactive brains of 'a,' 'b,' 'd,' 'e,' 'g,' and 'h' from **T1** to **T2** and created three new identical brains for each participant, resulting in twenty-seven new brains labeled ('a1' to 'i3'). The original six brains were revived, leading to a total of thirty-six participant brains in the lab. -/- Results -/- If our third experiment holds validity, it suggests that all twenty-seven artificially created brains and the revived six brains could function, resulting in thirty-six operational brains at T2. This includes the three live brains of 'c,' 'f,' and 'i.' -/- Discussion -/- Determining whose consciousness resides within the lab is practically impossible, except for 'c,' 'f,' and 'i.' For instance, if you are 'a' before *T1*, identifying which of the eleven identical brains ('a', 'a1', 'a2', 'a3', etc.) contains your consciousness at *T2* is challenging. Assuming your consciousness exists in all eleven brains post *T1* raises critical questions: Did your singular consciousness cease to exist, or did it transfer to a specific brain outside the lab? This dilemma highlights profound implications for our understanding of consciousness and identity. -/- Conclusion -/- If your existence ceased (no afterlife- discontinued 'your'-'a'- consciousness-) at T1, theoretically, "you (a)" could reappear ( at T2 ) in two or more identical brains, in the laboratory setting. However, as extensively discussed in this research, a single consciousness can't exist in multiple brains simultaneously. While there may be two, many, or even infinite identical brains in the universe/s, no one experiences( 'feel-aware' ) their consciousness in multiple places simultaneously. Although, the brain's quality and quantity continually change over time—encompassing aspects such as neurons, neurochemistry, and the biophysics of brain function—unique consciousness persists from childhood to death within a single brain. The hypothesis concerning the continuum of unique consciousness within the dynamic framework of the material brain presents a complex enigma. It posits that two unknown fundamental particles—one universally unique ( to a certain brain) and invariant and the other subject to continuous evolution—coexist within the brain throughout its functional lifespan. This coexistence may elucidate the mechanisms underlying consciousness and its persistence, despite the brain's ongoing structural and functional transformations. This simple reasoning strongly supports the high probability of life ('your' -' a') after death occurring in a single brain at T1,( outside the lab) without any passage of time. (shrink)

The system R## of "true" relevant arithmetic is got by adding the ω-rule "Infer VxAx from AO, A1, A2, ...." to the system R# of "relevant Peano arithmetic". The rule ⊃E (or "gamma") is admissible for R##. This contrasts with the counterexample to ⊃E for R# (Friedman & Meyer, "Whither Relevant Arithmetic"). There is a Way Up part of the proof, which selects an arbitrary non-theorem C of R## and which builds by generalizing Henkin and Belnap arguments a prime theory (...) T which still lacks C. (The key to the Way Up is a Witness Protection Program, using the ω-rule.) But T may be TOO BIG, whence there is a Way Down argument that produces a better theory TR, such that R## ⊆ TR ⊆ T. (The key to the Way Down is a Metavaluation, on which membership in T is combined with ordinary truth-functional conditions to determine TR.) The result is a theory that is Just Right, whence it never happens that A ⊃ C and A are theorems of R## but C is a non-theorem. (shrink)

_Background:_ Neurofeedback training (NFT) to decrease the theta/beta ratio (TBR) has been used for treating hyperactivity and impulsivity in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); however, often with low efficiency. Individual variance in EEG profile can confound NFT, because it may lead to influencing non-relevant activity, if ignored. More importantly, it may lead to influencing ADHD-related activities adversely, which may even result in worsening ADHD symptoms. Electromyogenic (EMG) signal resulted from forehead muscles can also explain the low efficiency of the NFT (...) in ADHD from both practical and psychological point-of-view. The first aim of this study was to determine EEG and EMG biomarkers most related to the main ADHD characteristics, such as impulsivity and hyperactivity. The second aim was to confirm our hypothesis that the efficiency of the TBR NFT can be increased by individual adjustment of the frequency bands and simultaneous training on forehead muscle tension. _Methods:_ We recruited 94 children diagnosed with ADHD (ADHD) and 23 healthy controls (HC). All participants were male and aged between six and nine. Impulsivity and attention were assessed with Go/no-Go task and delayed gratification task, respectively; and 19-channel EEG and forehead EMG were recorded. Then, the ADHD group was randomly subdivided into (1) standard, (2) individualized, (3) individualized+EMG, and (4) sham NFT (control) groups. The groups were compared based on TBR and EEG alpha activity, as well as hyperactivity and impulsivity three times: pre-NFT, post-NFT and 6 months after the NFT (follow-up). _Results:_ ADHD children were characterized with decreased individual alpha peak frequency, alpha bandwidth and alpha amplitude suppression magnitude, as well as with increased alpha1/alpha2 (a1/a2) ratio and scalp muscle tension when c (η 2 ≥ 0.212). All contingent TBR NFT groups exhibited significant NFT-related decrease in TBR not evident in the control group. Moreover, we detected a higher overall alpha activity in the individualized but not in the standard NFT group. Mixed MANOVA considering between-subject factor GROUP and within-subject factor TIME showed that the individualized+EMG group exhibited the highest level of clinical improvement, which was associated with increase in the individual alpha activity at the 6 months follow-up when comparing with the other approaches (post hoc t = 3.456, p = 0.011). _Conclusions:_ This study identified various (adjusted) alpha activity metrics as biomarkers with close relationship with ADHD symptoms, and demonstrated that TBR NFT individually adjusted for variances in alpha activity is more successful and clinically more efficient than standard, non-individualized NFT. Moreover, these training effects of the individualized TBR NFT lasted longer when combined with EMG. (shrink)

We consider the set of jumps below a Turing degree, given by JB={x':x≤a}, with a focus on the problem: Which recursively enumerable degrees a are uniquely determined by JB? Initially, this is motivated as a strategy to solve the rigidity problem for the partial order R of r.e. degrees. Namely, we show that if every high2 r.e. degree a is determined by JB, then R cannot have a nontrivial automorphism. We then defeat the strategy—at least in the form presented—by constructing (...) pairs a0, a1 of distinct r.e. degrees such that JB=JB within any possible jump class {x:x'=c}. We give some extensions of the construction and suggest ways to salvage the attack on rigidity. (shrink)

in American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3), July 2007, pp. 259-72. Argues that epistemically normative claims are made true by the same facts as, but do not mean the same as, certain natural-sounding claims.

Evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum of the electroencephalogram are commonly used to assess the extent of brain responses to stimulation with noxious contact heat. The magnitude of the N- and P-waves are used as a semi-objective measure of the response to the painful stimulus: the higher the magnitude, the more painful the stimulus has been perceived. The strength of the N-P-wave response is also largely dependent on the chosen reference electrode site. The goal of this study was to examine (...) which reference technique excels both in practical and theoretical terms when analyzing noxious contact heat evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum. We recruited 21 subjects. We applied seven noxious contact heat stimuli using two temperatures, 51°C, and 54°C, to each subject. During EEG analysis, we aimed to identify the referencing technique which produces the highest N-wave and P-wave amplitudes with as little artifactual influence as possible. For this purpose, we applied the following six referencing techniques: mathematically linked A1/A2, average reference, REST, AFz, Pz, and mathematically linked PO7/PO8. We evaluated how these techniques impact the N-P amplitudes of CHEPS based on our data from healthy subjects. Considering all factors, we found that mathematically linked earlobes to be the ideal referencing site to use when displaying and evaluating CHEPS in the amplitude-time spectrum. (shrink)